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CHAMBERS V. MARONEY: NEW DIMENSIONS IN THE LAW
OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE
In Chambers v. Maroney,' the Supreme Court held that a warrant-
less search of an automobile, based upon probable cause, and undertaken
at a place not the scene of the legal arrest while the occupants were
secure in a jail cell, was a valid search under the fourth amendment.'
Six years earlier, in Preston v. United States,' the Court had ruled that
the search of an automobile, not based upon probable cause and con-
ducted at a point remote in time and place from the scene of a lawful
arrest, was not incident to the arrest and was therefore invalid without
a search warrant. The Chambers decision diminishes the effect of several
leading cases relating to the reasonableness of searches under the fourth
amendment4 and raises important questions regarding the permissible
scope of police. activity in relation to the conduct of such searches.
Traditionally, there have been two methods by which police could
execute a valid search without a warrant: incident to a valid arrest or
upon probable cause to search under "exigent circumstances." These
two situations are the only exceptions to the strict requirement that a
search warrant be issued under the scrutiny of a magistrate in order to
meet the fourth amendment reasonableness test.5 The rationale for the
1. 399 U.S. 42 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Chambers].
2. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
For the Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourth amendment as to various aspects of
the amendment's freedoms see Griswold v. State of Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) ;
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) ; Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961) ; Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) ; Berger v. State of New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967) ; Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960) ; Ex Parte Jackson, 96
U.S. 727 (1877); Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967) ; Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) ; Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963) ; United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) ; Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.
S. 89 (1964) ; Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946). See generally LaFave, Search
and Seizure: The Course of True Law ... Has Not... Run Smooth, 1966 U. Ii. L.F.
255; Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Mat's Land in The Criminal Law, 49 CALIF. L.
RaV. 474 (1961) ; Note, Scope Limitations for Searches Incident to Arrest, 78 YALE L.J.
433 (1969); Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the
Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CH. L. REv. 664 (1961).
3. 376 U.S. 364 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Preston].
4. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) ; Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969) ; Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
5. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) Justice Stewart, speaking for the
majority stated:
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search warrant exception to searches incident to arrest is generally stated
to be for protecting the arresting officer, depriving the arrestee of any
potential means of escape, and avoiding destruction of evidence by the
arrested person.' Thus, the police may search a suspect they have arrested
at the scene of the arrest. The great majority of police searches are con-
ducted in this manner.7 The exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement arises when the police have the requisite probable
cause to obtain a warrant, but certain circumstances make that course
of action impractical.'
In Chambers, the defendant, accompanied by three men, was riding
in an automobile when stopped by police shortly after a service station
hold-up. Two teenagers had observed the hold-up and supplied informa-
tion to the police.' All occupants were arrested, and the automobile was
towed to the police station and parked."0 While the suspects were in-
carcerated, the police conducted a search of the automobile which un-
covered incriminating evidence." The search at the station was con-
Over and again this court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth]
Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes, . . . and that searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.
6. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). Justice Minton, speaking
for the majority, upheld the search of the petitioner's desk and file cabinets incident to
the arrest although there was ample time to obtain a search warrant. The majority stated:
It is not disputed that there may be reasonable searches, incident to an arrest,
without a search warrant. Upon acceptance of this established rule that some
authority to search follows from lawfully taking the person into custody, it
becomes apparent that such searches turn upon the reasonableness under all the
circumstances and not upon the practicability of procuring a search warrant,
for the warrant is not required ....
7. During 1966, in the city of San Francisco 29,084 serious crimes were reported to
the police. In an effort to solve these crimes, the police engaged in thousands of searches.
The great majority of these searches were conducted incident to the arrest as evidenced
by the fact that only 17 search warrants were obtained by the police during the entire
year. For similar statistics see Graham, The Court May Propose but the Police Dispose,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1968, § 4, at 9, Col. 1 and also L. Tiffany, D. McIntyre, and D.
Rotenberg, DEmCTION OF CRIMIE, 100-05 (1967).
8. See note 20 infra.
9. The hold-up occurred May 20, 1963, in North Braddock, Pennsylvania. The
teenagers told the police that the robbers were riding in a light blue compact station
wagon and that one of the robbers was wearing a green sweater. Frank Chambers' light
blue compact station wagon was the auto stopped by the police. At the time of his arrest,
Chambers was wearing a green sweater.
10. Pennsylvania, unlike a number of other states, does not have a statute that gives
the police the right to impourid the vehicle of an arrested individual. Therefore, in
Chambers, the car was not officially impounded, but it was parked in front of the police
station.
11. The evidence found was a pair of .38 caliber revolvers, a hand glove filled with
small change, and business cards bearing the name of a gasoline station attendant who
had been robbed one week earlier.
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duced without a search warrant. The evidence thus obtained was in-
troduced at Chambers' trial which resulted in his conviction for robbery
on two separate counts."2 A habeas corpus petition, initiated by Chambers,
was denied by a United States District Court" and the denial was
affirmed by the court of appeals.1' Petition for certiorari was granted."2
Chambers contended that the damaging evidence should not have been
admitted at trial. He rested his claim on the fourth amendment prohibition
against unreasonable searches. The determinative issue thus became
whether the exclusionary rule'8 prohibited introduction at trial of the
incriminating evidence found during the warrantless search of the auto.
The first major case to come before the Supreme Court involving a
12. The second count arose from the robbery of a service station in McKeesport,
Pennsylvania one week earlier. After a mistrial, the Court of Oyer and Terminer of
Allegheny County convicted Chambers of robbery on both counts.
13. 281 F. Supp. 96, (W.D. Pa. 1968). The court denied the petition because the
error complained of, late appointment of counsel, was harmless; the district court based
its decision on Young v. Boles, 270 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. W. Va. 1967).
Since 1961, federal courts have entertained petitions for habeas corpus filed by state
prisoners alleging that evidence unconstitutionally seized under the fourth amendment
was admitted at their trials. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), Justice Clark
speaking for the majority stated:
In extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally
unreasonable searches-state or federal-it was logically and constitutionally
necessary that the exclusion doctrine-an essential part of the right to
privacy-be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly
recognized by the Wolf case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional
right by Wolf could not consistently tolerate denial of its most important
constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused
had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise
is to grant the right but in reality withhold its privilege and enjoyment.
Id. at 655.
14. 408 F.2d 1186 (1969). The circuit court of appeals agreed with the district
court since "the 'record' contains 'adequate affirnztive evidence to overcome the pre-
sumption of harm from the lack of time for preparation' by appointed counsel." Id. at
190. The appellate court relied on Fields v. Payton, 375 F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1967).
15. 396 U.S. 900 (1969).
16. The Supreme Court did not hold that the exclusionary rule applied to state
trials until Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Mapp the appellant was convicted for
knowingly having had in her possession lewd and lascivious books, pictures, and photo-
graphs. The Supreme Court of Ohio found that her conviction was valid though based
upon the introduction into evidence of the books and photos which had been seized dur-
ing an unlawful search of the defendant's home. Speaking for the majority, Justice
Clark found the exclusionary rule to be applicable to the states. Clark stated:
The ignoble' shortcut to conviction left open to the state tends to destroy the
entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people
rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the States, and the right to be secure against
rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore, constitutional in
origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise . . . we
can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who,
in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.
Id. at 659.
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warrantless search of an automobile was Carrol v. United States.1 7 In
that case, two individuals riding in an automobile were stopped on a
highway by federal agents who had probable cause to believe the pair
were acting in violation of the National Prohibition Act." After stopping
the automobile, the police immediately conducted a search and found
68 bottles of whiskey and gin. The Court, in upholding the conviction
based upon this evidence, ruled the bottles properly admissible as the
fruit of a reasonable search, since the vehicle could have been driven out
of the jurisdiction while a warrant was being procured.'" There was thus
established an exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement
founded upon the mobility of the object to be searched; the "mobility"
gave rise to an exigency2" thereby negating the need for a warrant.
In Preston v. United States," the Court denied the exception to the
warrant requirement. The defendant had been arrested for vagrancy
while seated in his auto. There was no immediate search at the time of
arrest. Instead, the police towed the auto to a garage and took the
defendant to the police station. Sometime thereafter, the police, without
a warrant, searched the auto and discovered two loaded revolvers, as
well as other evidence, later relied upon to convict Preston of conspiracy
17. 267 U.S. 132 (1925) [hereinafter cited as Carroll].
18. In Carroll the arrest was for violation of the National Prohibition Act, title 2,
§ 25, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305, 315 (repealed in 1933). The subsequent conviction was for
violation of that statute.
19. To substantiate its reasoning, the Supreme Cqurt in Carroll relied- on a number
of statutes to show that the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures
by the fourth amendment traditionally had been construed as distinguishing the search
of an auto from the search of a home. The statutes cited by the Court include Act of
July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§24-27, 1 Stat. 29, 43-44; Act of August 4, 1790, ch. 35, §§ 48-51, 1
Stat. 145, 170: Act of February 18, 1793, ch. 8, § 27, 1 Stat. 305, 315; Act of March 2,
1799, ch. 22, §§ 68-71, 1 Stat. 677-78; Act of February 28, 1865, ch. 67, §§ 1-3, 13 Stat.
441-42; Act of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, § 1-3, 14 Stat. 178-79; Act of March 3, 1899, ch. 429,
§ 174, 30 Stat. 1253, 1280. But see Justice Harlan's dissent in Chambers where he notes
that the Carroll decision upheld a warrantless search for contraband.
20. The reasons for granting the police this expanded discretion in exigent cir-
cumstances are the same as those for granting the police the right to search incident to
an arrest, i.e. to protect the officer and to avoid the chance of destruction of evidence.
For an example of an exigent circumstance case see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966). Schmerber had been convicted in municipal court of driving while under the
influence of alcohol. Evidence of intoxication had been based on a blood test taken by a
physician at a hospital after Schmerber had been injured in a collision. The defendant
objected to the use of the evidence against him on three grounds-one of which was
unlawful search and seizure. The court concluded that under the circumstances the
officer was not required to get a warrant before the blood test because of the time
required to obtain a warrant and the rapid rate at which the body eliminates alcohol from
the blood.
See also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) ; Trupiano v. United States,
334 U.S. 699 (1948) ; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) ; and McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
21. 376 U.S. 364.
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to rob a federally insured bank.2 The search in this. case was sought to
be upheld as "incident" to the arrest since it was clear the police had no
probable cause to search for evidence of the crime of vagrancy. The
conviction was reversed on the grounds that the admitted evidence was
the product of an illegal search. Mr. Justice Black stated:
The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for
example, by the need to seize weapons and other things which
might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape .... But
these justifications are absent where a search is remote in time
or place from the arrest. Once an accused is under arrest . . .
[w]e think that the search was too remote in time or place to
have been made as incidental to the arrest and conclude, there-
fore, that the search of the car without a warrant failed to
meet the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment,
rendering the evidence obtained as a result of the search
inadmissible."
While the search in Carroll was justified as an exception to the warrant
requirement because of the auto's mobility, the search in Preston was
deemed unreasonable since the police had removed the auto from the
scene of arrest.
The restriction of police authority, as evidenced by Preston, is in
consonance with the Supreme Court's recent application of fourth amend-
ment principles. Historically, the Court has mandated that where ample
time exists to obtain a warrant, a search conducted without prior judicial
scrutiny will be held invalid.24 In Katz v. United States25 this mandate
was reaffirmed. The petitioner, Charles Katz, was convicted for trans-
mitting wagering information by telephone in violation of a federal
statute.28 At trial the government was permitted, over objection, to
22. Id. The evidence found in the search of Preston's auto included two loaded
revolvers, which were found in the glove compartment, caps, women's stockings, rope,
pillow slips, an illegally manufactured license plate and other items uncovered in the
trunk. The police were unable to open the trunk so they entered the trunk through the
back seat.
23. Id. at 368.
24. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) ; Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928); Go-Bart v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1930); United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) ; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
25. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Katz].
26. Charles Katz was convicted by the Disrict Court for the Southern District of
California under an eight count indictment for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1961). That
statute provides in part:
(a) Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly
uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign
commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or
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introduce evidence of the petitioner's conversations overheard by federal
agents. The agents had attached an electronic listening and recording
device to the outside of a pubilc telephone booth enabling them to hear
the conversation. The prosecution argued that the agents had probable
cause to "search" the petitioner's words, but Justice Stewart, speaking
for the majority, reversed the conviction. The Court held that searches
"conducted without prior judicial approval" were unreasonable except
in a few well-deliniated situations.27 The judicial preference for search
warrants is so strong that, according to Katz, even if probable cause is
present the search is unlawful without a warrant. While the subject of
the search in Katz was not an auto, the Court's language and broad
mandate are indicative of a strong judicial attitude applicable to all types
of searches. Katz and Preston, therefore, have had substantially the same
effect on fourth amendment freedoms, since both cases severely limit the
prerogatives of the police to engage in warrantless searches.29
There is one further case which requires discussion prior to a
closer analysis of the Chambers decision. The scope of permissible searches
incident to arrest have usually depended upon the circumstances of each
case. ° For example, if a suspect was legally arrested in his apartment,
wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire
communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result
of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers,
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years or
both.
27. The exceptions are: whenever the automobile can be easily driven out of the
jurisdiction or the existence of exigent circumstances or hot pursuit.
28. In Katz, the F.B.I. agents had probable cause to place a wiretap on the phone
booth that Katz was using. The Court admitted that the agents would have been able
to satisfy the prerequisites for a search warrant. The majority opinion stated:
[The Government] argues that surveillance of a telephone booth should be
exempted from the usual requirement of advance authorization by a magistrate
upon a showing of probable cause. We cannot agree. Omission of such
authorization,
'bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of
probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of
an after-the-event-justification for the . . . search, too likely to be
subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment.'
Beck v. Ohio.
389 U.S. at 358.
29. Preston limits the leeway allowed police to search extensively in that it forbids
searches remote in time and place from the arrest, while Katz forbids warrantless
searches where ample time exists to obtain a warrant.
30. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). In Harris, F.B.I. agents searched
the suspect's 4-room apartment under the authority of an arrest warrant charging him
with mail fraud. Although he was arrested in his living room, the search of the entire
apartment was upheld since, according to Chief Justice Vinson, "his control extended
quite as much to the bedroom in which the draft cards were found as to the living room
in which he was arrested." Id. at 152. See also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56
(1950) ; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1931) ; Davis v. United States, 328
CHAMBERS v. MARONEY
the search for evidence could extend throughout the apartment if the
object sought could be concealed within the premises.3 ' However, if it
were impossible for the object sought to be concealed in the apartment,
the search could only extend to the suspect's person and his immediate
vicinity in order to prevent access to weapons or destructible evidence.32
In 1969, the Supreme Court altered this doctrine in Chimel v. Cali-
fornia."3 In that case the police, after a lawful arrest, searched the
defendant's entire three bedroom house for a number of stolen coins. The
Court found that this warrantless search incident to Chimel's arrest
went beyond its permissible scope:
Application of sound Fourth Amendment principles to the
facts of this case produces a clear result. The search here went
far beyond the petitioner's person and the area from within
which he might have obtained either a weapon or something
that could have been used as evidence against him. There was
no Constitutional justification in the absence of a search war-
rant, for extending the search beyond that area. The scope of
the search was, therefore, "unreasonable" under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments .... ."
Like Preston and Katz, Chimel also restricted the area of constitutionally
permissible searches. Furthermore, it is arguable that while the search in
Chimel was that of a house, the Court's rationale should also apply in
automobile searches.3" In light of Chambers, however, these restrictions
appear to have lost a great deal of their potency.
The majority in Chambers initially concedes that the search of the
car, as in Preston, was not incident to the arrest. Justice White, for the
majority, distinguishes Preston on the grounds that in that case the
police had no probable cause to search at the scene of the arrest, while in
U.S. 609 (1946) ; Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) ; Abel v. United States,
362 U.S. 217 (1960).
31. Therefore, if the object sought was a stolen check, the search could extend
throughout the entire apartment.
32. The rationale being that it is impossible for a large object, like an auto, to be
hidden in an apartment.
33. 395 U.S. 752 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Chinel].
34. 395 U.S. at 768.
35. See Note, Chiinel v. California: A Potential Roadblock to Vehicle Searches, 17
U.C.L.A. L. Ray. 626 (1970). The author states:
In Chinel the court provided relatively workable criteria for determining the
constitutionality of an incidental search of a residence. Clearly, however, the new
standard was to be applicable to searches under a broader range of circumstances
than those encountered in Chimel alone.
Id. at 626. The author then argues that Chimel does apply to auto searches.
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Chambers that element was clearly present."G Given this distinction,
Justice White disposes of Preston as useful precedent. At the outset, his
reasoning follows the traditional Carroll exception that since it was not
practicable to secure a warrant for the search of the car on the highway
because of its "mobility", and since the police had probable cause to
search at that time and place, the warrant requirement should be waived.
But, as Justice White recognized, that reasoning by itself does not
resolve the Chambers situation, since the auto had been moved from the
scene of the arrest and was in police custody. The resolution of this
distinction is the critical and most problematic link in the logic of the
opinion. The Court indulges in balancing constitutional values and in
creating legal fictions to overcome the crucial distinction. This judicial
technique succeeded in shifting the focus of the opinion from an inquiry
into the basic validity or invalidity of the search in light of permissible
police conduct as defined in prior decisions, to one of measuring degrees
of intrusions on fourth amendment freedoms.
Justice White determines that there were two courses of action
open to the police in Chambers: they could search the car immediately
or they could temporarily immobilize the car until a warrant was issued.
Weighing the two, he finds the former to be the most expedient and
least intrusive." He reasons that since the constitution gave the police
no authority to seize Chambers' car, the fact that it was taken to the police
station and parked is immaterial, since in theory the car could have been
moved from the jurisdiction before a warrant could be obtained. The car
thus remained "mobile" at the police station and within the Carroll
rationale. Therefore, Justice White concludes that the police took the
least intrusive action, and as a result the warrantless search was reason-
able under the fourth amendment.
36. The police had no probable cause in Preston since there could be no probable
cause to search for the "fruits" of the crime of vagrancy.
Justice White also disposed of Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216
(1968) as precedent. In Dyke, the defendant was convicted of criminal contempt which
resulted from shots fired at a non-striker in violation of an injunction. Defendant's car
was stopped in another town for speeding and the car's occupants were taken to jail.
While they were being booked, their car was searched and a rifle was found and later
introduced at trial. The search was held unconstitutional because probable cause to search
never existed. Justice White points out, however, that probable cause to search did exist
in Chambers.
37. Justice White reasoned,
For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand
seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a
magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a
warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.
399 U.S. at 52.
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Justice Harlan, dissenting on the fourth amendment issue, con-
sidered the majority opinion as ignoring the principles set forth by past
decisions circumscribing permissible searches without warrants. 8 While
not denying that where an arrest is accompanied with a warrantless
search of the arrestee's person and of "the area from within which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence" is permissible,
Harlan believes "the search may go no further." 9 Nor, does Harlan
deny that an exigency occurs in a Carroll situation based upon mobility.
Harlan, however, sees Chambers as an unwarranted expansion of Carroll
because the requisite exigent circumstances which would have justified
the search were absent: "I cannot agree that this result is consistent
with our insistence in other areas that departures from the warrant
requirement strictly conform to the exigency presented."4
Justice Harlan prefers to dispose of Chambers on the authority of
Preston, as he finds the cases indistinguishable. He states that Preston
expressly did not rely on a lack of probable cause in finding the search
remote in time and place from the scene of the arrest. To the contrary,
Preston was based upon the premise that the more reasonable course for
the police was to retain custody of the car for the short time necessary
to obtain a warrant. In contrast to Justice White's result in weighing
constitutional values, Justice Harlan finds that a warrantless search
involves "a greater sacrifice of Fourth Amendment values" when com-
pared to the minimal inconvenience suffered by the occupants, already in
custody, from the temporary seizure required to obtain the warrant.
The Court's rationale in Chambers necessitates a re-evaluation of
the latitude permitted police in search and seizure activities since the broad
pronouncements of Preston, Katz and Chimel appear to be on tenuous
ground. By finding the presence of exigent circumstances in Chambers,
the Supreme Court has modified the trend of restricting police activities
under the fourth amendment. If an exigency of mobility exists while the
suspects are incarcerated and the object of the search is in police custody,
it becomes difficult to predict those circumstances which would not
qualify as exigent. In light of Chambers, it is conceivable that successful
arguments will be advanced in the future alleging that exigent circum-
stances exist, thus permitting warrantless searches in fact situations
similar to Katz, Chimel and Preston.
38. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) ; Preston v. United States, 376 U.S.
364 (1964); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) ; McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451 (1948) ; Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
39. 399 U.S. at 61.
40. Id. at 62-63.
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The Court in Katz held that whatever one seeks to preserve as
private should be kept private in the absence of a search warrant. Even
though Katz's conversations concerned illegal activities, he sought to
keep those conversations private. In the same manner, although the
evidence found in the search of Chambers' auto was incriminating, it is
reasonable to assume that Chambers also sought to keep that evidence out
of the police's possession. Considering that the place of the search in
Chambers was a police station and that the mode utilized by the police
was a warrantless search," the decision apparently conflicts with the
privacy rationale of Katz. In summary, because of Chambers, it could be
argued that Katz's mandate for search warrants has been weakened.
The impact of Chambers on the Chilnel doctrine must also be
considered. Chirnel narrowed the scope of a constitutional warrantless
search to the suspect's person and the area from within which he might
obtain a weapon or destructible evidence. Since the exclusionary rule is
aimed at preventing police abuses,4 2 the restrictive effects of Chimel
should apply to all warrantless searches, including those of automo-
biles.4" However, by expanding the exigent circumstances rationale to a
41. See Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of
Fourth Amendment Protecion, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 968 (1968). In this Note, the author
puts forth his interpretation of the meaning of Katz. He states:
The fourth amendment protects the personal privacy of each individual from
unreasonable intrusion by the government. The focus of deliberation in this
area has properly shifted from the protection against governmental invasions
of characteristically private places to the protection of a positive right of
privacy of the individual under the circumstances. In determining the limits of
the intended privacy which is entitled to protection from official intrusions, it is
not sufficient to weigh the element of risk and conclude that a reasonable man
under the circumstances would expect his privacy to be undisturbed. Such
expectation must be of a type that society would respect in the face of the kind
of intrusion which has ocurred [sicl. Thus, both the place and the mode of
search must be considered in light of prevaling social conventions to deter-
mine their effect on the validity of the individual's intended exclusive control
over personal information.
Id. at 986-87.
42. The Chinel majority stated in footnote 12 of the opinion:
We cannot accept the view that Fourth Amendment interests are vindicated so
long as "the rights of the criminal" are "protect [edl . . . against introduction
of evidence seized without probable cause." The Amendment is designed to
prevent, not simply redress, unlawful police action ....
395 U.S. at 767 n. 12.
43. See Note, Chinel v. California: A Potential Roadblock to Vehicle Searches,
17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 626 (1970). The author states:
This comment has further focused on the prospective application of Chimel to
the area of vehicular searches and concluded that the application of the rule in
that area should be much the same as in the area of residential searches. In
reaching that conclusion . . . the "exceptions" to the fourth amendment warrant
requirements . . . in searches on probable cause alone, and in the "moving vehicle
exception" of Carroll v. United States should be reconsidered in light of Chimel.
Id. at 650. The author also states:
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remote and warrantless search, Chambers has ignored the Chimel
proposition that the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment was
designed to have a deterrent effect on police activity.4"
The continuing validity of Preston is, likewise, in doubt. Justice
Black, author of the unanimous opinion in Preston, joined with the
majority in Chambers. Initially Preston and Chambers differ with
respect to the issue of exigent circumstances. Black, finding the warrant-
less search in Preston remote and unconstitutional also must have found
a lack of an exigency. In Chambers, however, Black must have found an
exigency since the warrantless search was remote but held constitutional.
Consequently, Preston is left on tenuous ground since it is difficult to
see how an exigency existed on the facts of Chambers, while no such
exigency existed in Preston. In both cases the search of the vehicle took
place while the vehicle was in police custody. The second aspect dis-
tinguishing Preston and Chambers is the issue of probable cause:
Preston lacked such, whereas Chambers did not. When probable cause is
present, a search is valid if it is either conducted with a warrant or under
exigent circumstances. Since the searches in both Preston and Chambers
were conducted without a warrant, they were justified only if exigent
circumstances were present. Preston apparently found that since the
police had custody of the car, it was not mobile and, therefore, there was
no exigency. Chambers, however, found mobility and hence an exigency
even though the car was in police custody.
If nothing else, Chintel should require a closer perusal of the facts to insure that
a Carroll situation in fact exists. The fact that it is an automobile which is
searched without a warrant should no longer justify the search, even where there
is probable cause to believe that evidence will be found ... where the police have
gained control of the automobile by acquiring the keys, the element of mobility
is non-existent, and the probability that the evidence will be destroyed is no
greater-if not less-than that which did not justify a search in Chimel.
Id. at 648. But cf. State v. Royal, 255 La. 651, 232 So.2d 465 (1970), where the Supreme
Court of Louisiana upheld the warrantless search of the defendant's car after it had been
towed to the police station. At the time of the arrest the auto was on a busy street, and
to have conducted an immediate search would have been impracticable. In State v. Keith,
-Ore. App.-, 465 P.2d 724 (1970), the warrantless search of an auto, an instrumentality
of the crime, after its removal to the police station was upheld since there was probable
cause to believe that an immediate search without a warrant was necessary to protect the
safety of the arresting officer. The problem with the Court's rationale in Keith is that the
search was tot immediate.
44. After setting forth the facts of Chimel the majority reasoned:
The search here went far beyond the petitioner's person and the area from
within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could
have been used as evidence against him. There was no constitutional justification,
in the absence of a search warrant, for extending the search beyond that area.
The scope of the search was, therefore, "unreasonable" under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments ....
395 U.S. at 768.
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The question therefore remains open as to whether Chambers has
sub silentio overruled Preston. This question is of importance in light
of the favor that the remoteness rationale has met in the lower courts.
That Chambers has in fact overruled Preston is evidenced by the case
of Wood v. Crouse.4" In Wood, the defendant was arrested on a highway
and his car was towed to a nearby police station. Twenty minutes after
the car had been secured by the police, a warrantless search of the vehicle
was conducted which the police had probable cause to undertake. In
that search, incriminating evidence was found and later introduced at
Wood's trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
relying specifically on Preston, found the search to be invalid since it was
remote in time and place from the arrest. On July 1, 1970, less than two
weeks after the Chambers decision, the Supreme Court vacated judgment
in Wood in light of Chambers.4"
Immediately after the Court handed down Chambers, a number of
lower court decisions began to appear which used the rationale of
Chambers as a basis for extending further the prerogative of the police.
In United States v. Free," the defendant was arrested and taken
approximately fifteen feet from his car while an officer engaged in a
warrantless search of the defendant's car. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit found that the search was not "incident to
the arrest" but proceeded to uphold the validity of the search on the
grounds of Chambers. Speaking for the majority, Judge Leventhal found
that Chambers articulated an exception to the warrant requirement
which permitted warrantless search of the auto without considering the
possibility of immobilizing it pending application for a warrant. Had
Free been decided prior to Chambers, it is possible that Chimel would
have controlled the court's decision. The majority opinion recognized this
but decided that Chimel was inapplicable in light of the "lesser intrusion"
theory" of Chambers.
Chambers has also been broadly interpreted by state courts. In
Middleton v. Maryland,49 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held
that Baltimore police officers, who had probable cause to believe the armed
robbery suspects' automobile contained a weapon, were justfied in search-
45. 417 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1969).
46. There are several other cases in which the lower courts have relied on the
remoteness doctrine of Preston even though probable cause to search was present. See,
e.g., Derby v. Cupp, 302 F. Supp. 686 (1969) ; Thomas v. United States, 376 F2d 564
(1967) ; Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158 (1967; Slade v. United States, 331 F.2d
596 (1964) and Sisk v. Lane, 331 F.2d 235 (1964).
47. 7 Crim. L. Rptr. 2458 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 12, 1970).
48. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
49. -Md. App.-, 267 A.2d 759 (1970).
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ing the car without a warrant after the suspects had been removed to
police headquarters. The court found that the search was permitted by
Chambers.
Chambers has also been applied by the California Court of Appeals,
Second District, in Bethune v. Superior Court.5" In Bethune, the de-
fendants were arrested for alleged narcotics violations. While in custody
their cars were taken by the police to another location. The cars were
searched without a warrant and a purse of one of the defendants was
found which contained narcotics. The court found that the search of the
purse was constitutional and admitted the evidence at trial. The court's
majority opinion illustrates the pervasive effect that Chambers has had
on the law of search and seizure:
We readily agree with her that the search of her purse after
she had become separated from it cannot be justified on the
basis that it was incident to her arrest. (Chimel v. California
... ) Until the Supreme Court decided Chambers v. Maroney
• . . , we could not have said with complete confidence that
the search of the purse could be upheld on any other ground.
• . . In Chambers, however, the court held that the rule that
permits warrantless searches of automobiles because of their
mobility if the police have probable cause to believe that they
contain contraband and other seizable items, extends to the
warrantless search of a car which has been immobilized by the
arrest of its occupants. . . . Given the right to search an
automobile, we can perceive no constitutional limitation on the
right to search the purse which petitioner had left in it.5
Free, Middleton, and Bethune demonstrate how the courts will
utilize Chambers to modify the effects of earlier cases that have narrowed
the power of the police to engage in extensive investigatory activities.
If the post-Chambers trend continues, the law of search and seizure
will take on a new dimension.
STEPHEN H. PAUL
50. 8 Crim. L Rptr. 2048 (Cal. App. Sept. 17, 1970).
51. Id. The defendant in Bethune had a reasonable expectation that her purse,
probably her most private possession, would not be searched. This California case con-
vincingly demonstrates not only how Chambers has reduced the potency of Preston and
Chimel, but also how the mandate of Katz has been weakened.
